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Abstract 
This report presents an example of the application of multi-
criteria decision analysis to the selection of an architecture for a 
safety-critical distributed computer system.  The design problem 
includes constraints on minimum system availability and 
integrity, and the decision is based on the optimal balance of 
power, weight and cost.  The analysis process includes the 
generation of alternative architectures, evaluation of individual 
decision criteria, and the selection of an alternative based on 
overall value.  In this example presented here, iterative 
application of the quantitative evaluation process made it 
possible to deliberately generate an alternative architecture that 
is superior to all others regardless of the relative importance of 
cost. 
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1.   Introduction 
A computer system is safety critical if its failure may cause or be a cont ributing factor in in jury or 
death of people, damage or loss of property, or damage to the environment (NASA, 2011).  During the 
development of a system, functional hazard assessments identify the potential system failure conditions 
and the severity of the consequences.  The guiding principle of system safety is to produce a design with 
an inverse relationship between the severity and probability of occurrence of functional failure conditions 
(FAA, 1988).  In general, it is not possible to satisfy the safety requirements without the use of hardware 
and/or software redundancy to m itigate the risks of system component failures (Miner, Malekpour, & 
Torres, 2002) (FAA, 1988).  For applications such as air and space vehicles, this need for redundancy to 
satisfy safety requirements conflicts with other system design objectives such total weight, power 
consumption and  development cost.  The preferred system design is one t hat maximizes safety while 
minimizing weight, power and cost.   
In this paper, we examine this cost-benefit relation to gain insight into the implications and trade-offs 
of architectural design features for safety-critical computer systems.  The approach taken here is to define 
a representative system design problem and follow the basic steps of a structured decision making process 
(i.e., determine alternative solutions, identify evaluation criteria, and evaluate the alternatives) (Anderson, 
Sweeney, Williams, Camm, & Martin, 2011) to generate information that would help a decision maker in 
choosing the best option from a set of alternative system architectures.  A brief overview of function and 
system safety is given in the next section.  This is followed by the problem statement, a review of the 
relevant literature, and the definition and evaluation of alternative architectures. 
 
2.   Function and System Safety 
A high-level functional safety assessment with a basic failure model defines three possible functional 
states: operational (i.e., not failed), failed passive and failed active.  A passive failure state is a loss-of-
function condition in which the function is not being performed.  A n active failure corresponds to a 
malfunction in which the function is performed incorrectly.  Passive and active failures are also known as 
omission and commission failures, respectively.   
The function performed by a com puter system can be modeled as a service consisting of a sequen ce 
(or flow) of service items (i.e., output updates), each characterized by a value and a time of occurrence.  
For a w orst-case functional safety assessment, we want to de termine the h ighest severity effect of a  
system failure.  For th is, we can defin e the s tate of the sy stem under an  increasingly permissive 
behavioral classification hierarchy in which a service can be in one of three possible states: operational, if 
only proper service items are being delivered; failed passive, if it includes not-failed and failed-passive 
items; and failed active, if there are not-failed, failed-passive and fa iled-active items.  A n operational 
service is a subset of a failed-passive service, which is a subset of a failed-active service.  Notice that in 
this model a failed-active service corresponds to an arbitrary failure with no constraints on the behavior 
exhibited by the system.  Intuitively, we want a safety-critical system to e ither operate properly or not  
operate at all (i.e., stop), rather than operate in an arbitrary manner.  The determination of the system state 
is based on the level of behavioral constraint that can be guaranteed at a particular point in time.   
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For some functions, the severity of a fa ilure depends on the dur ation of the condition.  The time to 
criticality after a failure is the minimum time to reach a particular severity level.  From a system design 
perspective, the time to criticality is how much time the system has to restore proper service and prevent a 
particular failure severity level from being reached.  For highly dynamic functions, the time to criticality 
can be very short (about tens or hundreds of milliseconds) and failure recovery within that time may be 
unfeasible or require an a utomated capability.  F or less dy namic functions, manual recovery by an 
operator may be adequate.   
The outcome of a functional safety assessment is in the form of sy stem integrity and av ailability 
requirements (Hasson & Crotty, 1997).  Integrity is measured as the probability that the system will not 
be in a failed-active state for a specified mission duration and operational conditions.  Availability is the 
probability that the system will be in the operational state at any point in time during a m ission of 
specified duration and operational conditions.  Availability during a m ission has two components: 
reliability and recoverability (or m aintainability).  Reliability is the probability that the system will 
continuously deliver proper service for a specified time duration under specified operational conditions.  
Recoverability is the probability that the system will restore proper service after a failure within a 
specified time duration under specified operational conditions.   
For some functions (e.g., aircraft flight control), the only safe condition is for the system to deliver 
proper service, as both loss of function and malfunction can be equally catastrophic.  In this case, the 
required probabilities for both availability and integrity will be extremely high.  For other functions, the 
relation between availability and integrity depends on the relative severity of passive and active failure 
conditions. 
Because of the uncertainties in the characterization of probabilities for physical hardware faults and 
for logical faults (i.e., design errors) in hardware or software, the safety requirements are often stated in 
terms of the response of the system to a certain number of internal component failures.  A fail-operational 
(FO) requirement means that the system shall co ntinue proper service delivery after the failure of an 
internal component.  For a fail-passive (FP) requirement, the system service shall transition to a passive 
state after an internal component failure.  For ex ample, a system may be required to remain operational 
after the first two internal failures and to fail passive after the third failure (i.e., FO/FO/FP).  Normally, a 
safety-critical computer system is required to contain at l east one internal component failure, which 
means that it will be at  a minimum fail-passive.  Fail-operational and f ail-passive conditions are 
deterministic statements of availability and integrity requirements.  For a computer system, a fail-passive 
requirement means that the failure must be either omissive or commissive but detectable by the service 
users or monitors, who would then take action to “passivate” the received service. 
 
3.   Problem Statement 
The design problem consists of selecting a processing and communication architecture for a system 
with preselected input and output modules.  Figure 1 illustrates the top-level system block diagram.  Only 
point-to-point communication links with fail-passive failure modes will be used.  As shown in Table 1, 
there are three different kinds of Input Modules and five different kinds of Output Modules.  The Input 
Modules and Output Modules of every kind are replicated, have the indicated failure modes, and require 
either one- or two-way communication with the processors.  These modules are common to all the system 
design solutions.  For system reliability calculations, a constant failure rate of 10-6 failures per hour is 
assumed for each of the modules. 
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Table 1: Characteristics of Input and Output Modules 
Input Modules Quantity Failure Mode Communication with the Processors 
S1 3 Active One-way 
S2 2 Passive One-way 
S3 2 Passive One-way 
Output Modules Quantity Failure Mode Communication with the Processors 
A1 3 Active Bidirectional 
A2 3 Active Bidirectional 
A3 2 Passive Bidirectional 
A4 2 Passive Bidirectional 
A5 2 Passive Bidirectional 
  
 
From a functional perspective, it is assumed that the processors must be able to receive valid data from 
every type of Input and Output Module in order to compute updates to send to the Output Modules (i.e., 
each functional output depends on every functional input).  I t is assumed that all the functions are on  
demand (i.e., p roper operation is desired) for the full duration of the mission.  T he performance of 
individual processors and communication switches and links is assumed to be  adequate to meet the 
workload demand without the n eed for performance-specific architectural features such a p arallel 
processing. 
It is assumed that physical faults are statistically independent and that the probability of two or more 
simultaneously arriving faults, or any single fault affecting multiple components, is negligible.  The 
logical design of the processors is classified as complex and the likelihood of a design error (i.e., a logical 
fault) in hardware or software is not insignificant.  The switches and links are assumed to be logically 
simple devices and correct by design.   
The system attributes to be considered in the evaluation of alternative system architectures include 
availability, integrity, weight, power, and cost.  Availability and integrity are beneficial safety-related 
qualities; weight, power and cos t are de trimental attributes.  T he minimum probabilistic safety 
requirements are unavailability ≤ 10-9 and integrity violation ≤ 10-9 for a 10-hour mission.  The minimum 
deterministic safety requirements are to preserve availability for one internal physical fault and to 
preserve integrity for two internal physical faults (i.e., Fail-Operational, Fail-Passive).  The system must 
Figure 1: Top-Level Block Diagram of the System 
Processors 
Input  
Modules 
P 
Output 
Modules 
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preserve availability and integrity for a minimum of one logical fault in either the hardware or software of 
the processors (i.e., Fail-Operational).  We are interested in achieving an optimal balance between weight, 
power, or cost, and there are no specific constraints or goals for these.    
 
4.   Literature Review 
To solve the design and decision problem, we need to generate alternative architecture designs and 
identify an evaluation function that combines the specified selection criteria.      
4.1.   System Architectures 
The availability and i ntegrity requirements can be satisfied with the appl ication of fault-tolerance 
concepts and techniques.  Nelson (1990) and Johnson (1989) offer insightful introductions to fault-
tolerant systems.  Error containment is th e prevention of error pr opagation across defined bo undary 
interfaces.  Error recovery is the process of preserving or restoring an operational system state.  Er ror 
containment techniques are the means to achieve fail-passive behavior, and error recovery techniques are 
used to realize fail-operational responses.  Hammett (2002) describes the fault tolerance characteristics of 
several system architectures.  Interestingly, a module with no error detection or recovery features can be 
conservatively assumed to always fail active as there is no way to guarantee passive failures.  Notice that, 
from a safety standpoint, a fail-operational response satisfies a fail-passive requirement.  Also, note that 
error recovery implies error containment, and this means that, in general, error recovery requires a higher 
degree of redundancy and redundancy management activity than error containment.   
Black (2005) offers an interesting summary of the amount of redundancy needed for fail-operational 
response as a f unction of the failure modes of the processors and the communication system.  Table 2 
(next page) shows that processor redundancy for fail-operational response is directly dependent on the 
failure modes of the processors and the communication system.  As would be expected, the architecture 
level design is s impler when the com ponents exhibit benign fail-passive behavior.  A chieving passive 
component failure modes requires local component-level redundancy.  Thus, there is a trade-off between 
component-level and architecture-level redundancy and complexity.  Powell (1992) showed that although 
conservative assumptions at the architecture level about component failure modes might seem intuitively 
advantageous from a saf ety (and integrity) perspective, the re sultant increase in architecture-level 
complexity may actually lower the reliability (and availability) of the system.  Lala (1991) observed that 
redundancy by itself only guarantees an increase in the arrival rate of faults and that a carefully planned 
redundancy management strategy is necessary to achieve an increase in system dependability compared to 
a non-redundant system of the same functionality. 
Meyer (1975) showed that the probability of fault detection for a component can be made equal to 
unity only if the de tector is as com plex, in te rms of the num ber of stat es, as the com ponent being 
monitored.  A self-checking pair configuration (Nelson, 1990; Hammett, 2002) consisting of two identical 
components connected to a simple comparison-based error detector is a common arrangement to achieve 
fail-passive response to physical faults.  Fo r communication system components, including links and 
switches whose only function is to transport data messages between communicating entities, it is common 
practice to rely on message encoding and o ther forms of s tate information embedded in the messages 
(such as a message sequence number) to achieve fail-passive behavior.  Such approaches are in use even 
for safety-critical applications regardless of the fact that they violate the assumptions in the calculations 
of communication service integrity.  Pau litsch, et al . (2005) recommend more technically sound 
replication techniques for intermediate communication stages like switches in order to guarantee 
  
 
 
5 
compliance with communication integrity and availability requirements.  
 
Table 2: Required processor redundancy for fail-operational fault response as a function of processor and 
communication failure modes 
Number of 
Faults 
Processor Failure 
Mode 
Communication Failure 
Mode  
Minimum Processor 
Redundancy 
1 Passive Passive 2 
Active Passive 3 
Active Active 4 
2 Sequential Passive Passive 3 
Active Passive 4 
Active Active 5 
 
 
Fault-tolerance techniques against logic design errors are similar to the techniques for physical faults.  
The main difference is t hat failure independence and non -coincidence for logic components are 
predicated on de sign dissimilarity.  T orres-Pomales (2000) describes a n umber of fault -tolerant 
architectural configurations applicable to logical component faults.  The development assurance level 
(DAL) of a logic component is a qualitative measure of the required development rigor, which is assumed 
to be negatively correlated with the likelihood of residual design errors and positively correlated with the 
cost of development.  ARP4754A (SAE, 2010) describes an approach for DAL assignment that takes into 
consideration fault severity mitigation using architectural features.   
4.2.   Design Evaluation 
In evaluating alternative system architectures, we seek an explic it and quantitative method that can 
measure the relative merit of the alternatives, rank them, and iden tify the be st choice.  T he system 
evaluation problem can be div ided in tw o parts: evaluation of ind ividual criteria and ag gregation of 
criteria into an overall value metric.   
The design evaluation criteria (or objectives) include availability, integrity, weight, power, and cost.  
All these system attributes can be obtained from attributes of the lower-level components and models of 
the system architecture.  Availability and integrity can be ev aluated using Reliability Block Diagrams, 
Fault Trees and Mark ov Models (Geist & Trivedi, 1990; Reibman & Veeraraghavan, 1991; Butler & 
Johnson, 1995; NASA, 2002).  Representative values for component fault rate, weight, power, and cost 
can be obt ained from vendors and pub lished sources, including (Hodson, et al., 2011).  Lap rie, et al. 
(1990) present a life-cycle cost model for various software-fault tolerant configurations.  We will assume 
that all hardware components use commercially available (COTS) products.  Notice that all the design 
alternatives must satisfy minimum safety requirements.   
Buede (2009) and Ca llopy (209) lis t a num ber multi-attribute value analysis methods, including 
analytical hierarchy process (AHP), percentaging, fuzzy algorithm, quality function deployment (QFD), 
and Pugh Matrix.  A ccording to B uede, these methods are eithe r not well founded or other analytical 
concerns have been raised about them.  Marl er and Arora (2004) surveyed the m ulti-objective 
optimization methods and cl assified them based on the articulation of preferences among objectives: a 
priori, a posteriori, and no articulation.  Only a-priori methods are of interest here, as we want our metric 
of overall value to reflect the relative importance of the system attributes.  A-priori methods include the 
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weighted global criterion method, weighted sum method, lexicographic method, weighted min-max 
method, and exponential weighted criterion method among others.  The most common multi-objective 
optimization method is the weighted sum method, in which the global objective function is the sum of the 
weighted value of the individual criteria.  This is the value function we have chosen to evaluate the 
alternative system architectures.  The formula for the overall value is: 
ሺሻ ൌ σ ሺሻୀଵ           
where x is the vector of individual system evaluation criteria (or objectives), xi is the absolute value the i-
th objective, vi is the relative value or utility of xi, and wi measures the relative importance of objective xi.  
The wi weights are commonly normalized to sum to 1, and the vi functions are defined on a common 
normalized range from 0 to either 1, 10, or 100.   
Buede (2009) describes the linear, concave, convex, and S-curve general forms of the value functions 
vi(xi) that represent the change in utility of xi as it varies in the range from the threshold to the goal value 
specified by the system requirements.      
Meya and Swoy (1992) describe two different utility (i.e., value) functions: endpoint and ratio.  The 
endpoint function is similar to Buede’s linear value function and consists of a linear interpolation between 
the utilities assigned to the endpoints of xi.  For the ratio function, the utility vi of a beneficial attribute is 
defined as log(xi/xi,min), where xi,min denotes the minimum value of xi.  The value of a detrimental attribute 
is defined as log(xi,max/xi), where xi,max is the maximum value of xi.  The ratio function has the advantage 
that it scales xi based on order of magnitude relative to the actual range of values of xi and no other 
subjective utility function is needed.   
If the system requirements do not specify the threshold or the goal for some attribute xi, the endpoints 
of xi could be taken as the minimum and maximum over all the alternate system designs in order to enable 
a meaningful and balanced evaluation using the value curves described by Buede (2009).  
Meya and Swoy (1992), Buede (200 9), and Ca llopy (2009) acknowledge the hi erarchical nature of 
value in the sense that the top-level value of a system can be expressed as a composition of increasingly 
refined evaluation criteria.  Mey a and Swoy (1992) refer to this as an attribute tree.  From this 
perspective, the v alue of a com posite criterion is defined in t erms of the ag gregate value of i ts sub-
criteria.   
Callopy (2003) considered the impact of technical risk on the overall value of a system.  Technical risk 
is the uncertainty in the performance of a system or its components.  System value risk is related to the 
sensitivity of the ob jective hierarchy to uncertainty in lower objectives.  The top ic of risk is outside the 
scope of this paper and is not pa rt of the system evaluation criteria.  H owever, a simple sensitivity 
analysis will be performed. 
 
5.   Alternative Architectures 
Looking at Figure 1, the Input and Output Modules are given, and the design problem is to determine 
the configuration for the processors and the communication network.  To satisfy the deterministic safety 
requirements, the processors and the network must incorporate redundancy and fault tolerance capabilities 
for error containment and recovery.  It is given that the links have passive failure modes.  The switches 
  
 
 
7 
are logically simple devices, which means that they are assumed not to have logical design errors and to 
fail only due to physical faults.  Thus, simple replication-based redundancy can be used to realize switch-
fault tolerance.  The processors are modeled as consisting of an application layer, a processing platform 
layer including the com putation hardware and an op erating system, and a co mmunication end sy stem 
element to handle the interaction with the network.  The processor hardware and software are assumed to 
be complex, and thus, they can fail due to residual design errors.  The hardware components can also fail 
due to physical faults.  The end systems are assumed to be logically simple components.  There are two 
main approaches to deal with design errors: acceptance tests and diversified design (Laprie, Arlat, 
Beounes, & Kanoun, 1990).  Based on the re sults presented by Hammet (2002) and Meyer (1975), the 
only way to ensure near perfect error detection coverage and containment is to have a detector that is as 
complex as the monitored system.  This essentially demands the use of full component replicas, or in the 
case of design errors, component variants with similar functionality but di ssimilarity in requ irements, 
design, or implementation.  Thus, dis similar redundancy will be used to re alize fault tolerance for the 
applications and the processing platform.     
Laprie, et al. (1990) and Hodson (2011) identify two basic forms of r edundancy management 
approaches: voting based and pairwise-comparison based.  In both cases, it is assumed that the redundant 
replicas or variants receive the same input sequence and are required the produce the same or equivalent 
outputs.  The voting approach uses a majority voter to decide the final correct output for a set of replicas 
or variants (Torres-Pomales, 2000).  For the pairwise comparison approach, pairs of replicas or variants 
are compared and on ly pairs w ith agreeing outputs are a ssumed to be c orrect.  T he final output for a 
configuration with pairwise comparison is taken from one of these agreeing pairs.   
Four different fault tolerant configurations were considered in the generation of alternative 
architectures.  For redundancy with (identical) replicas to tolerate only physical faults, there is the voted 
replica (VR) configuration in which a voter is used to decide the final output from multiple replicas, and 
the self-checking replica (SR) configuration consisting of pairwise comparisons and the logic for 
selecting a good output from a pai r of agreeing replicas.  For redund ancy with dissimilar variants, the 
voted variant (VV) configuration uses voting as t he decision logic, and the self-checking variant (SV) 
configuration uses pairwise comparison and selection.  Thus, the VR and SR configurations are applicable 
to the n etwork switches, and the VV and S V configurations are relevant to the applications and the 
processing platform.   
For the definition of alternative system architectures, it was assumed that different physical faults or 
design errors are triggered (i.e., cause the generation of data errors) sequentially such that, at any time, the 
system has to deal with at most one active component failure and can recover from it before another fault 
is triggered.  This is a critical assumption that is given in the problem statement and is consistent with the 
definition of deterministic safety requirements.  
In a voting configuration, the individual redundant elements can be fail-active as the voter acts to both 
contain and mask component failures.  T he realization of a fa il-operational, fail-passive response with 
voting fault tolerance requires a minimum redundancy of three, such that the voter can mask the fi rst 
component failure (i.e., fail-operational response) and the system gets reduced to two operational 
components, and then on the second failure, the voter detects a discrepancy and stops the generation of 
outputs (i.e., fail-passive response).   
For a s elf-checking configuration, a f ail-operational, fail-passive response requires two redundant 
pairs.  The first component failure causes a redundant pair to fail passive and the output decision logic to 
select the other pair, thus realizing the fail-operational response.  If the second component failure affects 
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the second redundant pair, the decision logic will detect the discrepancy and stop the generation of output 
as required for fail-passive response.  Note that voting and selection of redundant data are performed at 
the receivers of the data rather than at the sources.  T his ensures failure independence between the 
redundant sources and the decision logic for redundancy management. 
Table 3 shows the specifications of the basic components used for the system architectures.  The cost, 
weight and power specifications were obtained from equipment manufactures’ websites for representative 
off-the-shelf devices.  The costs for applications and processors are for high-assurance designs,   and the 
values were determined using the cost multipliers for step increases in development assurance levels 
given in (HighRely, Inc., 2009): 
Cost(DAL D) = 1.05 x Cost(DAL E, not safety relevant) 
Cost(DAL C) = 1.30 x Cost(DAL D) 
Cost(DAL B) = 1.15 x Cost(DAL C) 
Cost(DAL A, highest safety criticality) = 1.05 x Cost(DAL B) 
The hardware-software cost ratios given by Dörenberg (1997, p. 33) and Spi tzer (2007, pp. 14-2) were 
used to estimate the cost of software: 
Software cost = 3.35 x Hardware cost  
For evaluating the architectures, 300-ft point-to-point data communication links were assumed for all the 
connections to t he network switches.  T he failure rate for the software applications was taken from a 
paper by Bleeg (1988) on fly-by-wire architectures.  All other failure rates were taken from the report by 
Hodson, et al. (2011) on avionics architectures.   
 
Table 3: Attributes of system components 
Component Cost ($) Weight (lbs) Power (W) Failure Rate (failures per hour) 
Application (Single variant) 85,158.94 0.0 0.0 1.00x10-7 
Processor (Hardware and Software) 24,723.56 2.0 38.0 3.33x10-5 
End System 7,000.00 0.5 6.5 5.04x10-6 
Switch 25,000.00 8.0 28.0 5.04x10-6 
Link (300 ft) 500.00 6.6 0.0 1.30x10-6 
 
Table 4 l ists the alternative architectures generated for evaluation.  T he abbreviations VV, SV, e tc. 
correspond to the fault tolerant configurations used for the corresponding components as indicated in the 
table.  The subscripts x,y indicated the number of replicas or v ariants per redundant channel and the 
number of channels in the configuration.  For example, for VV1,4 there was one variant per channel and 4 
channels in the configuration, for a total of 4 variants of the corresponding component.  Architecture SA7 
had 4 proc essing channels, each w ith one pro cessor variant and 3 application variants with a voted 
configuration.  O n architecture SA7, the same set of app lication variants was replicated on each 
processing channel to take advantage of the low failure rate of individual application variants and to limit 
the total cost of the applications to only three variants. 
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In each configuration, every processor, Input Module and Output Module had one bidirectional link to 
each switch.   
Table 4: Alternative System Architectures 
Architecture Applications Processing Switches 
SA1 VV1,4 VV1,4 VV1,4 
SA2 VV1,4 VV1,4 SR2,3 
SA3 SV2,3 SV2,3 VV1,4 
SA4 SV2,3 SV2,3 SR1,3 
SA5 VV3,1 SV2,3 VV1,4 
SA6 VV3,1 SV2,3 SR2,3 
SA7 VV3,1 VV1,4 SR2,3 
 
 
The architectures were modeled using reliability block diagrams.  All faults were assumed permanent, 
and fault recovery was assumed to be instantaneo us until the point of to tal system failure due t o 
exhaustion of ope rational resources.  With th is assumption, the ev aluation of availability is s imply an 
evaluation of reliability.   
Reliability was evaluated using a commercial off-the-shelf tool (PTC, 2013).  All the a rchitectures 
required a hig her degree of redundancy to m eet the probabilistic safety requirements than what was 
strictly needed to meet the deterministic requirements.  Furthermore, every model was too complex to 
complete the full-system reliability analysis without running out of memory resources.  The main source 
of model complexity comes from  the need to a ccurately describe th e conditions under w hich proper 
operation is preserved as l ink failures occur.  I nstead of com puting the reliability for whole systems, 
multiple overlapping sections of the models were analyzed separately to achieve some confidence that the 
overall design met the availability and integrity requirements.  An implication of this is that the actual 
probabilities for these architectures are not available.  This was taken into consideration in the evaluation 
and comparison of the architectures as described in Section 8.  Section 6 provides additional information 
about the reliability analyses. 
The structure of the fault tolerant configurations used in the alternative architectures, combined with 
the assumption of sequential fault triggering, ensures that satisfying the reliability requirement will also 
satisfy the integrity requirement. 
 
6.   Reliability Analysis 
Reliability block diagrams (RBD) were used to compute the reliability of the alternative architectures.  
RBD models capture the inter-components dependencies that must be satisfied for the system to remain in 
an operational state.  A  series configuration with two or more components means that all of tho se 
components must remain operational in or der for the system to rem ain operational.  A  basic 1 -of-m 
parallel configuration means that at least one component must remain operational.  In general, an n-of-m 
parallel configuration represents a dependence relation such that the system will remain operational if at 
least n of the m redundant paths (or channels) are operational.     
Figure 2 shows the RBD model for architecture SA7.  The RBD is composed of sections for the 
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various architectural components: applications (App); processing (Proc); switches (SW); S1, S2, and S3 
input modules; and A1, A2, A3, A4, and A5 output modules.  Most of the complexity in the model is due 
to the need to accurately capture the conditions that guarantee successful communication between 
network terminals (i.e., processors and input and output modules).  Four operational internal data flows 
are required in order for the system to remain operational: from input modules to processors, from output 
modules to processors, from processors to processors, and from processors to output modules.  As links 
fail, only certain combinations of connections between the terminals and the switches can guarantee 
successful end-to-end dataflow.  As the system is intended for safety-critical applications, the reliability 
calculation (and thus the RBD) must be made with respect to conditions for which an operational state 
can be guaranteed (i.e., must do a pessimistic, worst-case analysis).   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Reliability Block Diagram for Architecture SA7 
 
The reliability analysis tool was unable to complete the analysis of a full architecture before running 
out of memory resources.  Because of this, it was decided instead to compute the reliability for sections of 
Applications Processing Switches S1 S2 S3 
A1 
A2 
A3 
A4 A5 
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the model.  Table 5 show s the calculated unreliabilites (= 1.0 – reliability) for each o f the alternative 
architectures.  O nly the m antissas are given, and a factor of 10-10 is im plicit.  T he switches had an 
insignificant contribution to the overall system unreliability.  I t is l ikely that most of th e unreliability 
contribution comes from the processors and the valid patterns of degradation of the network paths. 
Table 5: Unreliabilities for Various Sections of the Alternative Architectures (x10-10) 
Model Section SA1 SA2 SA3 SA4 SA5 SA6 SA7 
App-Proc 3.32 3.03 4.57 4.34 4.56 4.34 3.04 
SW 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 
App-Proc-SW 3.33 3.04 4.57 4.34 4.56 4.35 3.05 
SW-Sall 5.01 5.01 5.01 5.01 5.01 5.01 5.01 
SW-A1 3.01 3.01 3.01 3.01 3.01 3.01 3.01 
SW-A2 3.01 3.01 3.01 3.01 3.01 3.01 3.01 
SW-A3 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 
SW-A4 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 
SW-A5 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 
 
 
7.   Evaluation Criteria 
The original intent was to compare the architectures based on the criteria of availability, integrity, cost, 
weight and power.  H owever, because it was not possible to g et the actual availability and integrity 
values, these were not used in the overall evaluation.  Instead, the availability and integrity requirements 
were simply taken as constraints that must be satisfied by the architecture, and any excess availability or 
integrity beyond the minimum constraints were not taken into account as beneficial to the overall value of 
the architectures.  Thus, only the detrimental attributes of cost, power, and weight were considered in the 
overall evaluation.   
The cost of a fault-tolerant configuration must take into consideration the life cycle cost, including 
requirements, specification, design, implementation, validation, verification, and maintenance.  Laprie, et 
al.  (1990) present a simple cost model for dissimilar redundancy configurations.  The cost model gives 
the maximum, minimum, and average cost multipliers for various fault tolerant configurations.  That 
model was applied by using the average multiplier for variants and the minimum multiplier for replicas.  
Table 6 shows the multipliers used to estimate the cost of redundant configurations. 
 
Table 6: Multiplicative Cost Factors for Redundant Configurations 
Redundancy 3 4 6 
Voted Variants 2.25 3.01 -- 
Self-Checking Variants -- 3.01 4.63 
Voted Replicas 1.78 2.24 -- 
Self-Checking Replicas -- 2.24 3.71 
 
The value (or utility) function for each criterion was defined over the range of all th e alternatives as 
the problem statement set no constraints or goals for any of the detrimental criteria.  The value functions 
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were defined as linearly decreasing from 1.0 at the minimum value of the criterion to 0.0 at the maximum 
value of the criterion.  Let xi,min and xi,max denote the minimum and maximum values for the i-th criterion.  
The value of xi is given by: 
vi(xi) = (xi,max - xi)/(xi,max - xi,min).   
The criteria were divided in two groups: weight and power, and cost.  This is consistent with the 
typical program objectives of performance and cost (as well as schedule) and allows the examination of 
the trade-off between performance and cost for the set of alternative architectures.  The relative 
importance of cos t versus power and w eight was varied from 0.0 to 1.0, and the re lative importance 
between power and weight was held constant at 0.5 each.   
 
8.   Evaluation of Alternatives 
Figures 3, 4, an d 5 s how the total cost, power, and weight for the alternative architectures.  The 
general cost patterns are that self-checking switches increase the cost of an architecture by about 5%, and 
using both self-checking processors and switches increases the cost by about 42%.  Se lf-checking 
switches also increase the power by about 17%, and self-checking processors and switches increase the 
power consumption by about 43%.  The upside for self-checking switches is that they tend to reduce the 
weight by about 20%, but the use of self-checking processors and switches reduces the total weight only 
3% more (23% total).   
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Total Cost for Alternative Architectures 
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Figure 4: Total Power for Alternative Architectures 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Total Weight for Alternative Architectures 
 
Figure 6 shows the ov erall value of the con figurations as the r elative importance of cost v aries from 
0.0 (not important) to 1.0 (only important criterion).  A rchitectures SA3 and SA4 with self-checking 
applications and processors decrease in value as the importance of cost increases, while all other 
architectures show an increase in value.  An interesting result is that the value of SA2 remains constant.  
This is an indication of a good balance between voting configurations for applications and processors and 
a self-checking configuration for the switches.  Architecture SA7, which was deliberately added to the set 
of alternatives after examining the results for the other architectures, takes this balance one step further by 
using the VV3,1 application configuration from SA5 and SA6 to reduce the cost of the applications using 
voting of three variants within each processing channel and replicating the application variants on each 
channel.  This application configuration increases the reliability and integrity of e ach channel.  The 
drawback of the VV3,1 application configuration is that the minimum required processing capacity per 
channel is the largest of all.  This is not reflected in any of the criteria or the overall value calculation. 
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Figure 6: Overall Value for Alternative Architectures 
 
Figure 7 show s the change in the u nreliability (= 1.0 – reliability) for the combination of the 
processors and switches of architecture SA7 when the failure rates of the end system, processing, and 
switch components are reduced or increased by a factor of 10.  The Input and Output Modules are not 
included in this analysis due to the limitations of the reliability analysis tool.  Figure 7 shows that the 
failure rate of the processing components is the most important determinant of system reliability for this 
architecture. 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Sensitivity of System Reliability to Component Failure Rate 
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9.   Concluding Remarks 
An example application of multi-criteria decision analysis has been presented for the selection of an 
architecture for a safety-critical distributed computer system with power, weight, and cost considerations.  
Seven alternative architectures were produced in an  iterative process that leveraged the ov erall multi-
criteria quantitative evaluation to deliberately generate an architecture that is superior to all others.  A 
reliability sensitivity analysis of the selected architecture showed that the failure rate of the processing 
platform, including the hardware and operating system, is the m ost important component that should be 
targeted for further development to enhance the system reliability.   
This example was a high-level analysis performed on abst ract system models that did no t include 
details that could be significant in the validity of the analysis for an actual realization of the system.  The 
models for c ost, weight, and power would normally be refin ed and v alidated before making a final 
architecture selection.  Additionally, the reliability models would also need to be simplified (to enable a 
full analysis) and validated.  Finally, the trade-off between using standard off-the-shelf components and 
high quality components would need to be examined to determine if any architectural simplification 
achievable with high quality components can be justified in a multi-criteria decision process.   
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